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We study the effect of market segmentation on international risk sharing. In our model, 
entrepreneurs consider undertaking risky projects in the real sector as well as selling 
part of their projects to investors. To capture the idea of market segmentation (i.e., 
agents from different countries have different opportunity costs of participating in the 
risky projects), the returns on the alternative risk-free investment are allowed to differ 
between the entrepreneurs and the investors. We first show that market segmentation 
establishes links between the risk-free and risky sectors as well as between the real and 
financial sectors. In particular, if there is market segmentation, then the amount of risk 
sharing depends on the risk-free rates and the expected return of the risky project. 
Moreover, the level of real investment also depends on the risk-free rates. Second, we 
show how different risk-free rates may encourage or discourage risk sharing, and even 
prevent risk sharing altogether. 
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1 Introduction
In a globalized economy, ﬁnancial markets play an increasingly important role
in allowing agents from diﬀerent countries to interact, begin risky projects,
and share risk. However, investment across national boundaries often suf-
fers from investment barriers, even after a recent period of liberalization of
international capital ﬂows.1 The OECD, for example, reports that FDI is
particularly vulnerable with government restrictions on the share of equity
held by foreigners and limits on foreign personal and operational freedom
(Golub, 2003).2 Some other examples of investment barriers include cor-
ruption,3 the protection of property rights and contract enforcement,4 the
diﬃculty foreigners have in obtaining information about foreign stocks, dif-
ferences in the depth and quality of ﬁnancial reporting, and a reluctance to
deal with foreigners (Jorion and Schwartz, 1986).
The presence of investment barriers implies that agents from diﬀerent
countries do not have access to the same types of investment opportunities,
i.e., there is market segmentation.5 To study how market segmentation alters
risk sharing and investment levels, we focus on international risk sharing
when opportunity costs for the risky assets sold on international ﬁnancial
1Several large, important economics such as China, Russia, Mexico, Japan, and India
scored poorly on the 2012 OECD FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index, which measures
statutory restrictions on foreign direct investment.
2For example, in France and Sweden in the mid-1980s foreigners were allowed to pur-
chase at most 20% of the total number of outstanding shares of a local ﬁrm. See Eun and
Janakiramanan (1986) for a list of European countries and their restrictions on foreign
equity holdings in local ﬁrms as of the mid-1980s. Some examples of more restrictive gov-
ernment imposed barriers include capital controls in Japan before 1980 in which foreign
companies could not buy Japanese securities and Japanese security ﬁrms could not buy
foreign ﬁnancial assets (Gultekin et al., 1989), and, until 2001, China’s A-share market,
open only to local investors, and a B-share market open only to foreign investors (Sun and
Tong, 2000).
3Wei (2000) ﬁnds that increases in corruption in a host country reduces inward FDI.
4Du et al. (2008) ﬁnds that the protection of property rights and contract enforcement
is a major of determinant of where US ﬁrms invest in China. See Mina (2012) for a
summary of the literature on the impact of domestic institutions on capital ﬂows.
5Given the existence of investment barriers, several papers have tested for market
segmentation empirically. For instance, Errunza and Losq (1985) ﬁnds support for mild
segmentation using securities data from the United States and less developed countries,
and Jorion and Schwartz (1986) ﬁnds evidence of segmentation using securities from the
United States and Canada.
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markets diﬀer across agents. The link between real and ﬁnancial decisions
has been previously studied in Mirman and Santugini (2012) in the case of
a monopoly ﬁrm owned by an entrepreneur who shares the risk with several
investors. In their model, markets are not segmented, i.e., the agents have
access to the same ﬁnancial markets and the opportunity cost of buying
shares of the risky asset is the same across the agents. Assuming away
market segmentation severs links between sectors. Indeed, the decision to
share the risk of the risky asset and the level of investment associated with
the risky asset are unaﬀected by the opportunity cost (i.e., the risk-free rate)
in their model. Moreover, the ownership structure among entrepreneurs and
investors depend solely on risk aversion and not the underlying risk of the
real sector (i.e., the distribution of the real payoﬀs).
We present a microstructure model in which risk-averse entrepreneurs
consider undertaking risky projects in the real sector as well as selling part
of their projects to risk-averse investors in the ﬁnancial sector. In addition to
the entrepreneurs’ risky investment, all agents have access to an alternative
investment. To capture the idea of investment barriers and market segmen-
tation, the alternative investment’s returns are allowed to diﬀer between the
entrepreneurs and the investors.6
After characterizing the unique equilibrium, we study the eﬀect of market
segmentation on the comparative analysis and the entrepreneurs’ ability to
share risk with the investors. We ﬁrst show that market segmentation estab-
lishes links between the risk-free and risky sectors, as well as between the real
and ﬁnancial sectors. More precisely, with equal risk-free rates (i.e., no mar-
ket segmentation), the degree of risk sharing and the level of real investment
in the risky project are both independent of the risk-free rate. Moreover,
the degree of risk sharing is independent of the expected payoﬀ of the risky
project. When risk-free rates diﬀer (due to market segmentation), the com-
6Several papers use diﬀering tax rates across groups as a catch all for the diﬀerent types
of international barriers that exist. See for example Black (1974) and Stultz (1981). In a
dynamic equilibrium model, Bems and Jo¨nsson Hartelius (2006) include a signiﬁcant in-
terest rate premium at which newly opened economies can borrow from abroad to capture
the idea that newly opened economics might not be able to borrow under the same con-
ditions as other economics that are already participating in international markets (Dia´z,
2012).
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parative analysis is richer. Indeed, the share of the risky project retained by
the entrepreneurs decreases in the risk-free rate oﬀered to the entrepreneurs,
increases in the risk-free rate oﬀered to the investors, and may increase or
decrease in the expected payoﬀ of the risky project depending on the ordering
of the risk-free rates. Finally, the level of real investment in the risky projects
increases in the risk-free rate oﬀered to the entrepreneurs but decreases in
the risk-free rate oﬀered to the investors.
We then show that market segmentation in the risk-free sector has an
eﬀect on risk sharing in the risky sector. When there is equal access to the
risk-free asset, risk sharing always occurs as the entrepreneurs participate
in the ﬁnancial market to reduce risk. The reduction in risk is achieved at
the expense of an unproﬁtable sale of shares, i.e., the return from selling a
share is less than the payoﬀ from retaining it. With diﬀerent risk-free rates,
the entrepreneurs’ opportunity cost of retaining a share of the risky asset
is diﬀerent than the investors’ opportunity cost of buying one, which may
encourage or discourage risk sharing. On the one hand, when the investors’
risk-free rate is the lowest, the entrepreneurs are able to exploit the diﬀerences
in the returns of the risk-free asset to make a proﬁtable sale of the risky asset
to investors who value the risky asset more than the entrepreneurs. In some
cases, the price that the investors are willing to pay is high enough that the
entrepreneurs sell the entire project, completing removing any exposure to
risk. On the other hand, when the entrepreneurs’ risk-free rate is the lowest,
the entrepreneurs might decide not to participate in the ﬁnancial market at
all, and thus market segmentation prevents risk sharing. The reason is that
the reduction of risk via risk sharing with the investors is too costly.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
characterizes the equilibrium. The eﬀect of investment barriers and market
segmentation on the comparative analysis and risk sharing are studied in
Sections 3 and 4, respectively. Section 5 provides ﬁnal remarks.
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2 Model and Equilibrium
2.1 Model
Preliminaries. We present a model with a continuum of entrepreneurs and
a continuum of investors, each of mass one. The objective of each agent is
to maximize the expected utility of ﬁnal wealth. We assume that agents’
preferences over ﬁnal wealth exhibit constant absolute risk aversion with
coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion ae > 0 for an entrepreneur and ai > 0
for an investor. In other words, the utility functions for ﬁnal wealth x are
exponential: u(x; a) = −e−ax, a ∈ {ae, ai}.
Entrepreneurs undertake costly projects that generate random proﬁts.
Moreover, they sell claims tied to the random proﬁts. The proceeds of the
sale are invested in a risk-free asset with rate of return Re > 0. The investors,
on the other hand, do not have entrepreneurial prospects, but have some
initial wealth and may purchase claims to the entrepreneurs’ proﬁts or invest
in a risk-free asset with rate of return Ri > 0. Due to investment barriers
and market segmentation, the returns of the risk-free asset that each type of
agent has access to are potentially diﬀerent: Re = Ri.7
Entrepreneurs. Each entrepreneur chooses the level of real investment
q. The payoﬀ to the investment is π˜ = (θ+ ε˜)q, where θ > 0 is the expected
payoﬀ of one unit of investment and ε˜ ∼ N(0, σ2) is a shock. For each unit
of investment, an entrepreneur incurs a cost of eﬀort c > 0. The cost, unlike
the payoﬀ, cannot be shared with investors, and is borne entirely by the
entrepreneurs.
In addition to choosing the level of investment, each entrepreneur decides
the ownership structure of his investment. Speciﬁcally, an entrepreneur re-
tains the payoﬀ from ωq units of investment, while selling the payoﬀ of the
remaining (1− ω)q units, where ω ∈ [0, 1] is the entrepreneur’s level of own-
ership. In other words, as an entrepreneur produces q units of investment, q
7Investors and entrepreneurs living in diﬀerent countries might have access to dif-
ferent outside options. Also, a bank might oﬀer a preferential treatment to either the
entrepreneurs or the investors depending on the group with which the bank has a closer
business relationship.
6
shares of a risky claim are issued of which ωq shares are retained and (1−ω)q
shares are sold. By selling a share of the risky claim at price P , which is
then invested into a risk-free asset with a rate of return Re, an entrepreneur
earns ReP but relinquishes θ+ ε˜. Hence, an entrepreneur’s ﬁnal wealth (net
of the cost of eﬀort) is
W˜ ′e = ω(θ + ε˜)q +ReP (1− ω)q − cq. (1)
Given CARA preferences and a normally distributed shock, there exists
a closed-form characterization of each agent’s certainty equivalent as well as
a strictly monotonic relation between utility and the certainty equivalent.
Hence, maximizing the certainty equivalent is equivalent to maximizing the
expected utility of ﬁnal wealth. The certainty equivalent approach is used
throughout the paper. The certainty equivalent of an entrepreneur is
CEe(q, ω, P ) = ωθq +ReP (1− ω)q − cq − aeσ2ω2q2/2. (2)
Investors. Each investor diversiﬁes his initial wealth Wi > 0 by buying
m shares of the risk-free asset and z shares of the risky claims on proﬁts.
Given the budget constraint Wi = m+ Pz, an investor’s ﬁnal wealth is
W˜ ′i = Ri(Wi − Pz) + (θ + ε˜)z, (3)
where Ri(Wi − Pz) is the return on investing Wi − Pz in a risk-free asset
with a rate of return Ri, and (θ+ ε˜)z is the payoﬀ from buying z shares from
the entrepreneurs. The certainty equivalent of an investor is
CEi(z, P ) = RiWi + (θ − RiP )z − aiσ2z2/2. (4)
2.2 Equilibrium
Since there is a continuum of entrepreneurs and investors, the ﬁnancial sector
is perfectly competitive, i.e., in the trading equilibrium entrepreneurs and
investors take the price of the risky asset as given. The trading equilibrium
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consists of the entrepreneurs’ investment and ownership decisions {q∗, ω∗},
the investors’ quantity demanded for the risky asset z∗, and the ﬁnancial price
P ∗. While Deﬁnition 2.1 refers to a trading equilibrium, there is also a no-
trading equilibrium in which the entrepreneurs do not share risk (including
the outcome that no investment is made at all). The no-trading equilibrium
simply refers to a constrained maximization problem for the entrepreneurs.8
Definition 2.1. The tuple {q∗, ω∗, z∗, P ∗} is an equilibrium if
1. Given P ∗,
(a) For any entrepreneur,




(b) For any investor,




2. Given q∗, ω∗, and z∗, P ∗ clears the market, i.e., (1− ω∗)q∗ = z∗.
Proposition 2.2 provides the equilibrium value of investment, q∗. Diﬀer-
ences in risk-free rates have an eﬀect on the existence of the project (i.e.,
whether investment is positive or zero) as well as the level of investment.
Proposition 2.2. In equilibrium, the level of investment is
q∗ =






Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 2.3 states the diﬀerent cases for risk sharing and the equi-
librium values of ω∗ and P ∗. Each entrepreneur may either sell his entire
project to the investors, retain full ownership, or share risk with investors,
8If there is no trading, z∗ and P ∗ are not deﬁned since there is no market. Further,
ω∗ = 1 so that, from (2), q∗ is the solution to maxq≥0 (θ − c) q − aeσ2q2/2.
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depending on the diﬀerences in the risk-free rates. In particular, the ab-
sence of risk sharing is due to a combination of diﬀerential risk-free rates and
unsharable cost.
Proposition 2.3. In equilibrium,
• For θ > c and Reθ ≤ Ric, there is a positive level of investment (i.e.,
q∗ > 0) but there is no trading of assets and entrepreneurs retain full
ownership (i.e., ω∗ = 1).










aiRe(θ−c)+ae(Reθ−Ric) , θ > c
0, θ ≤ c . (9)
Proof. See Appendix A.
Because the eﬀect of diﬀerential risk-free rates is related to the allocation
of the proﬁt claims, it is convenient to study the equilibrium from the view-
point of the allocation of shares between entrepreneurs and investors. For-
mally, deﬁne x ≡ ωq to be the number of shares retained by an entrepreneurs
and y ≡ (1 − ω)q to be the number of shares sold to the investors, so that
q ≡ x+ y and ω ≡ x/(x+ y).
Proposition 2.4. In equilibrium, the number of proﬁt claims retained by an
entrepreneurs is
x∗ =
max{θ − c, 0}
aeσ2
, (10)
while the number of claims sold to investors is
y∗ =
max{Reθ − Ric, 0}
aiσ2Re
. (11)
Proof. See Appendix A.
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The presence of diﬀerential risk-free rates has a profound eﬀect on the
equilibrium. In the next sections we study the eﬀect of diﬀerential risk-
free rates on the comparative analysis and on the trading of assets and risk
sharing.
3 Comparative Analysis
In this section, we show that diﬀerential risk-free rates have an eﬀect on
the comparative analysis. We consider ﬁrst the benchmark case of no mar-
ket segmentation in the risk-free asset as studied in Mirman and Santugini
(2012) for the case of a monopoly ﬁrm sharing risk with many investors.
Proposition 3.1 states that when risk-free rates do not diﬀer the allocation
of the risky asset and the level of real investment are independent of the
common risk-free rate. Moreover, the allocation of the risky asset is immune
to changes in its mean return.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose that θ > c and R ≡ Re = Ri. Then, from (7)
and (9),
1. q∗ is independent of R, and
2. ω∗ is independent of θ and R.
Proposition 3.2 states that the ownership structure depends on the ex-
pected payoﬀ of the risky asset, θ, when the entrepreneurs and the investors
face diﬀerent risk-free rates.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose that entrepreneurs and investors have diﬀerent
risk-free rates. Then, from (9), ω∗ increases in θ if and only if Re > Ri.
Figure 1 shows graphically the eﬀect of θ on the entrepreneurs’ level of
ownership. In the benchmark case, when risk-free rates do not diﬀer, en-
trepreneurial ownership is independent of θ. Consider now the case in which
the entrepreneurs have the highest risk-free rate. When θ is close to the
marginal cost, the entrepreneurs retain ownership over only a very small










Figure 1: The Eﬀect of θ on Ownership
entrepreneurial ownership increases and converges to the level of ownership
in the benchmark case. Consider next the case in which the investors face the
best risk-free rate. When the expected payoﬀ of the risky asset is close to the
marginal cost, the entrepreneurs retain the entire ownership of the project.
As the expected payoﬀ increases, it becomes more proﬁtable to expand the
investment through the ﬁnancial market and to sell part of the project. Sim-
ilarly, entrepreneurial ownership converges to the level of ownership in the
benchmark case as θ increases.
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Proposition 3.3 states that both the ownership structure and the level of
real investment depend on the risk-free rates of return when the entrepreneurs
and the investors face diﬀerent risk-free rates.
Proposition 3.3. Suppose that entrepreneurs and investors have diﬀerent
risk-free rates. Then, from (7) and (9),
1. q∗ increases in Re and decreases in Ri, and
2. ω∗ decreases in Re and increases in Ri.
Diﬀerential risk-free rates have an eﬀect on the ownership structure and
the level of real investment solely through the number of claims sold to
investors. Indeed, from (10), the optimal number of shares retained by the
entrepreneurs is always independent of the rates of return of the risk-free
assets. However, from (11), the number of shares sold depends positively
on the ratio Re/Ri. If entrepreneurs face a higher risk-free rate, selling
a share of the risky asset and investing the proceeds in the risk-free asset
yields a higher return. However, as the investors’ risk-free rate increases,
investors’ willingness to pay for the risky asset decreases, which, in turn,
lowers the entrepreneurs’ net revenues. Hence, as the entrepreneurs’ risk-free
rate increases, entrepreneurs increase the number of shares sold to investors
in order to take advantage of a better risk-free rate. As the investors’ risk-free
rate increases, entrepreneurs reduce the number of shares sold as investors are
willing to pay less for the risky asset. Since q∗ = x∗+y∗ and ω∗ = x∗/(x∗+y∗),
both the level of investment and ownership of the entrepreneurs depends on
the risk-free rates, solely through the ﬁnancial market, in the way stated in
Proposition 3.3.
4 Risk Sharing
Under a common risk-free rate, entrepreneurs always access the ﬁnancial
market and share the risk with investors when undertaking a project. The
single motivation for accessing the ﬁnancial market is to reduce risk as en-
trepreneurs are unable to make a proﬁtable sale: net revenue RP ∗ − θ from
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selling a share is always negative. In other words, entrepreneurs accept a
lower expected ﬁnal wealth in order to reduce the risk premium. Consistent
with Mirman and Santugini (2012) for the case of a monopoly ﬁrm sharing
risk with investors, Proposition 4.1 states that when an entrepreneur decides
to undertake a risky project, the absence of market segmentation allows the
ﬁnancial market to exist and shares to be traded as long as the expected
return is higher than the cost of the project.
Proposition 4.1. Suppose that R ≡ Re = Ri. Then, from (7) and (9),
there is risk sharing if and only if there is a positive level of investment, i.e.,
if and only if θ > c. Further, from (8), RP ∗ − θ = c− θ < 0.
With diﬀerential risk-free rates, however, entrepreneurs do not always
share risk with investors. Moreover, entrepreneurs’ net revenues from selling
a share can be positive.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose that entrepreneurs and investors have diﬀerent
risk-free rates. Then, from (9), each entrepreneur
1. sells the entire project (i.e., ω∗ = 0) if θ < c and Reθ > Ric.
2. shares risk (i.e., 0 < ω∗ < 1) if θ > c and Reθ > Ric.
3. retains the entire project (i.e., ω∗ = 1) if θ > c and Reθ < Ric.
Further, from (8), entrepreneurs make a proﬁt when selling the entire
project, i.e., ReP
∗ > θ if θ < c and Reθ > Ric.
With diﬀerential risk-free rates, the entrepreneurs may make a proﬁtable
sale or reduce risk or both. A proﬁtable sale is due to diﬀerential risk-
free rates, which creates an arbitrage investment opportunity between the
entrepreneurs and the investors. Entering the ﬁnancial market for arbitrage,
rather than risk sharing, occurs only when the entrepreneurs face the best
risk-free rate and are encouraged to sell shares of the risky asset because of
a relatively high return in the risk-free asset. Moreover, the relatively low
risk-free rate available to the investors induces them to pay a higher price for










θ = RiRe c
Figure 2: Re > Ri
ReP > θ. In fact, in same cases, each entrepreneur sells his entire project
because the arbitrage opportunity outweighs any beneﬁts from risk sharing.
Consequently, the entrepreneurs prefer to sell the entire project as they not
only rid themselves of all risk, which reduces the risk premium to zero, but
also increase their expected ﬁnal wealth because of the high price paid by
investors. From Figure 2, each entrepreneur sells the entire project with a
net real beneﬁt ReP
∗
F − θ > 0 when θ ∈ [Ric/Re, c], Re > Ri.
As much as diﬀerential risk-free rates gives entrepreneurs an arbitrage
incentive to enter the ﬁnancial market, it might also prevent them from selling
shares due to a too high cost. This might occur when the entrepreneurs’
alternative risk-free investment is worse than the investors’. In that case,
entrepreneurs might be unable to obtain from the investors a price of the
risky asset high enough to induce them to participate in the ﬁnancial market.
Consequently, the entrepreneurs retain ownership because the payment for









θ = cθ = RiRe c
Figure 3: Re < Ri
Retaining the entire project occurs when θ ∈ [c, Ric/Re], Re < Ri, as shown
in Figure 3. Note that the entrepreneurs never sell the entire project if faced
with a worse risk-free rate than the investors.
Finally, with diﬀerential risk-free rates, the entrepreneurs might also share
the risk with investors. This occurs when θ > max{c, Ric/Re}, as shown in
Figures 2 and 3. However, unlike in the case of a common risk-free rate,
accessing the ﬁnancial market might also yield a positive net revenue from
selling a share. In other words, entrepreneurs might have more than one
reason to access the ﬁnancial market, i.e., they might want to risk share,
and, at the same time, make the sale of shares proﬁtable.
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5 Final Remarks
In this paper we have presented a microstructure model in which risk-averse
entrepreneurs decide whether to undertake risky projects and how much risk
to share with risk-averse investors. When market segmentation exists, i.e.,
when the entrepreneurs and investors have diﬀerent opportunity costs of
investing, risk sharing depends on the risk-free rates and the expected return
of the risky project, unlike in the case when markets are not segmented.
Moreover, we show how diﬀerent risk-free rates may encourage or discourage
risk sharing and even prevent risk sharing altogether.
We have abstracted from one important aspect, namely we have assume
that everyone has the same information. In fact, asymmetric information is
ubiquitous among shareholders. In a dynamic setting learning would occur
as the price of the risky asset would be used by the uninformed investors as
a signal of the expected payoﬀ. We leave such an extension to future work.
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A Proofs
We provide a combined proof of Propositions 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4. To that
end, we consider the entrepreneur’s maximization problem from the point
of view of the allocation of the proﬁt claims. Formally, let x ≡ ωq be
the number of shares retained by the entrepreneur and y ≡ (1 − ω)q be
the number of shares sold to the investor so that q ≡ x + y and ω ≡
x/(x + y). Using (2), an entrepreneur’s maximization problem is rewrit-
ten as maxx,y≥0 {(θ − c)x+ (ReP − c)y − aeσ2x2/2}. For interior solutions,





In perfect competition, it must be that ReP = c yielding (8). In order to
determine y∗, we solve for z∗. Using (4), the ﬁrst-order condition with respect
to z yields
z∗ =
θ − RiP ∗
aiσ2
. (13)
Plugging (8) into (13) and using the market-clearing condition y∗ = z∗ yields




From (12) and (14), interior solutions for x∗ and y∗ exist when θ > c and
Reθ > Ric, i.e., entrepreneurs share the investment’s proﬁts with investors.
If the expected payoﬀ is less than the marginal cost, i.e., θ ≤ c, then x∗ = 0.
Similarly, if the marginal revenue of selling a share is always less than the
marginal cost, i.e., Reθ ≤ Ric, then y∗ = 0. Therefore, due to the corner
solutions, three types of outcomes with no risk sharing are possible. First,
each entrepreneur undertakes the project and retains ownership of it, i.e.,
x∗ > 0 and y∗ = 0. Second, each entrepreneur proceeds with the investment
but sells the entire project, i.e., x∗ = 0 and y∗ > 0. Finally, the investment
does not take place when x∗ = 0 and y∗ = 0. Combining the interior and
corner solutions yields (10) and (11), or, equivalently, (7) and (9).
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